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international law of the sea is actually fused with the whole system of international law 9 .
Custom as a source of the international law of the sea a) General remarks
Traditional approach to customary international law: two-element concept of customary law. The general nature of a customary rule.
In classical terms, international customary law is referred to as practice accepted as law. Article 38(2) of the PCIJ Statute, and currently, Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute refer to this understanding as well, although in a manner that is not particularly logical ("international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law") 10 . As such, proving the existence of customary rules requires demonstrating practice (usus) which is related to the belief that it expresses a legally binding rule, and not just the usual practice (opinio juris sive necessitatis). In this way, custom is co-determined by two, albeit co-occurring, elements.
The ICJ is quite clearly in favour of the two-element concept of customary law, which is also applied in the field of law of the sea. In its judgment in the Continental Shelf case (Libya v. Malta) of 03. 06.1985 11 , it stated: "It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States […] ". Similarly, in arbitration caselaw, we are dealing with references to the two-element concept. By way of example (although outside the scope of law of the sea), in the judgment in the Texaco-Calasiatic v. Government of Libya case of 19.01.1977 12 , it was indicated that customary international law "est établi à la suite de pratiques concordantes considérées par la communauté internationale comme étant droit" (para. 59).
The two-element concept of customary law was also adopted by the UN International Law Commission in their latest works entitled Identification of customary international law, which resulted in the draft conclusions of 2016 (hereinafter: Draft ILC conclusions on CIL) 13 . The Commission stated explicitly (draft conclusion 2 [3]): "To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris)". In addition, the Drafting Committee concluded that in the process of assessing the existence of individual elements, "the overall context, the nature of the rule, and the particular circumstances in which the evidence in question is to be found" should be taken into account. It was also emphasized that each element must be assessed (proven) separately (draft conclusions 3 [4]). The two-element concept of customary law is also quite widely approved within the doctrine of international law, however, understanding of its elements and their relationships are the subject of numerous controversies 14 . In this context, by way of example one can cite the traditional definition of custom (although formulated with regard to international humanitarian law) formulated by C. Bruderlein. He held that "custom is the widespread repetition, in a uniform way and over a long period, of a specific type of conduct (repetitio facti), in the belief that such conduct is obligatory (opinio juris sive necessitatis). It is a series of successive acts which gradually become common practice, observed in good faith and finally accepted by all"
15 . The result of practice, which is considered as law, is establishing the existence of a customary rule. This rule is in fact rather general in terms of its content, which brings it closer to a general principle of law. Although it lacks a general character, and it defines the powers and obligations of its recipients, the regulatory capacity of a customary rule has its limitations. In this context, the ICJ judgment on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area of 12.10.1984 (Canada v. United States of America) 16 held that "A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law which in fact comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the members of the international community […] ". Customary rules can regulate powers and procedures only to a very limited extent. By their very nature, they are not capable of establishing international institutions. These restrictions are certainly not insignificant to the law of the sea.
The basis of customary law
In international legal theory, the basis of the binding force of customary law is discussed. Two trends of thought can be discerned: voluntarism and objectivism 17 . According to the first of them, which draws its inspiration from the formula of generally rendering international law dependent on the consent of states expressed in the PCIJ judgement in the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey) case of 07. 09.1927 18 , the basis of binding force is at the very least a silent consent to be bound by custom (pactum tacitum). As a result, on the one hand, a custom is consensual, but on the other hand there is no such thing as a common custom, only a particular one. The voluntarist theory directly corresponds with the two-element concept of customary law, and its current acceptance is quite broad. The weaknesses of this theory are the need to prove consent, and doubts regarding admissibility and scope of admissibility of tacit consent.
14 H Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (2014) 56. The doctrinal disagreements are emphasized by DP Fidler, ' Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law ' (1996) 39 German Yearbook of International Law 201. 15 C. Bruderlein, 'Custom in international humanitarian law ' (1991) 285 International Review of the Red Cross 581. 16 [1984] ICJ Rep 246 (299), para. 111. In French version: "Il ne faut pas rechercher dans le droit international coutumier un corps de règles détaillées. Ce droit comprend en réalité un ensemble restreint de normes propres à assurer la coexistence et la coopération vitale des membres de la communauté internationale […] ". 17 Synthetically: PM Dupuy, Droit international public (2006) 334-335. 18 According to the Court: "International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims". PCIJ Publ. Series A, No 10, 3 (18) .
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The problem is also that consent is usually recognized a posteriori, which raises doubts as to whether it actually ever existed (even silent but conscious) when the practice was shaped. The objectivist direction, drawing its inspiration from the thought of F. C. von Savigny, is based on the assumption that custom is a result of a social need felt by the members of the international community, inducing them to act in a certain manner. It is not necessary that it be unanimously held by the members of the international community, just enough for the reminding efforts to be sufficiently extensive. As a result, the will of individual countries can be subordinated to thus established customary law, which thereby achieves a universal scope. The objectivist theory only partially corresponds to the two-element concept of customary law. It may, however, support the efforts of contemporary reinterpretations of custom. Its weakness is ignoring the will of individual countries and weakening the significance of states' activity in the creation of customary law.
Methodology of reconstructing the custom
Customary law does not arise as a result of planned actions of specific countries. Unlike treaties, it is created to a large extent spontaneously, and, in a sense, even chaotically 19 , which does not mean that it is created in an entirely unconscious manner that does not correspond to the specific interests or needs of countries. Moreover, its existence (its components), validity and content are not determined in a systematic way, but most often in specific cases, in the event of an international dispute and, under these conditions, a posteriori, not a priori 20 . It is difficult to conclude that customary law is created in a planned way 21 . In the case of customary law, the issue is also whether determining the existence, validity and content of a customary rule can take place only by way of induction, i.e. on the basis of empirical analysis of the practice of legal entities and their attitude to this practice, or rather by way of deduction, i.e. on the basis of generalization of a single event or incidental practice, with -at the very least -tacit approval of countries which are not involved in a given case or practice as a rule in force, or maybe in an entirely different manner. The significance of this dispute is not purely theoretical. In some areas of international law, such as new areas of law, e.g. in international investment law, or those in which the participation of a larger group of countries is still not possible, e.g. due to technical and financial reasons, such as space law, practice may indeed be very limited. Additionally, if there are no treaties regarding a given area, or there is little acceptance for said treaties among the countries, then the problem of a kind of legal vacuum may arise, which can be detrimental to the international community. Then, the recognition of the existence of customary rules in a way other than by induction can have tremendous practical significance, but also raises different kinds of doubts. In an interesting study on the ICJ's case-law on customary law, S. Talmon   22 argues that the Court uses three methods of reconstruction of customary law: induction, deduction, and assertion. Decisions concerning the law of the sea play a significant role in this characteristic. The author pointed out that although the ICJ cannot freely choose between induction and deduction, there are, however, four situations where the inductive method cannot be used: 1) "state practice is non-existent because a question is too new" (Gulf of Maine Case); 2) "state practice is conflicting or too disparate and thus inconclusive" (Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case); 3) "opinio juris of states cannot be established" (North Sea Continental Shelf and Qatar/Bahrain Cases); 4) "there is a discrepancy between state practice and opinio juris" (Nicaragua Case). In such situations, the Court should declare non liquet, but it does not. It reaches for the deductive method. Within deductive reasoning, S. Talmon distinguishes normative deduction, functional deduction and analogical deduction. The first one occurs when new rules are inferred from existing rules and principles of customary international law (e.g. in the Gulf of Maine case, "the Court inferred practical methods for the delimitation of a single maritime boundary from special international law rules"). Functional deduction occurs when the Court "deduces rules from general considerations concerning the function of a person or an organization". The author also noted that deduction can be used to confirm and strengthen inductive reasoning. Finally, analogical deduction is considered a reflection of "main forms of civilization and […] the principal legal systems of the world" (Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case).
S. Talmon also notes that the ICJ sometimes uses assertion as its method of reasoning. It occurs when the Court considers a specific custom notorious, and also when it rules as a legislator, without going into the analysis of traditional elements of a custom (Corfu Channel Case) or even contrary to them. The author points out that ICJ uses several assertion techniques. He includes among them: 1) reference to ILC works, without any verifications of their actual nature; 2) declaration ex cathedra that a certain provision is reflective of customary international law (UNCLOS-based assertion); 3) building customary rules or developing them upon its own assertions (extending the uti possidetis rule to offshore islands and historic bays in Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras Case).
In the summary of his paper S. Talmon says that "There is no greater danger of law creation in deduction than there is in induction". Deduction presupposes the existence of implied rules in a manner similar to implied powers. He believes that deduction is compatible with the consent principle. However, he makes the stipulation that "new rules of customary international law are deduced only from existing legal rules or principles and not from postulated values". He also stresses that "The deductive method finds its limits in the actual will of states, as expressed by their constant and uniform practice. Thus, in the event of a conflict between rules of customary international law arrived at by induction and those arrived at by deduction, the former will prevail". The author justifies the assertion method by stating that if inductive and deductive methods do not allow the Court to fulfil its judicial function, then the Court has to be able to use assertion.
However, while recognizing the complexity of methodological issues, one must note that deductive and assertion methods are difficult to reconcile with the two- A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law which in fact comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the members of the international community, together with a set of customary rules whose presence in the opinion juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas. It is therefore unrewarding, especially in a new and still unconsolidated field like that involving the quite recent extension of the claims of States to areas which were until yesterday zones of the high seas, to look to general international law to provide a ready made set of rules that can be used for solving any delimitation problems that arise. A more useful course is to seek a better formulation of the fundamental norm, on which the Parties were fortunate enough to be agreed, and whose existence in the legal convictions not only of the Parties to the present dispute, but of all States, is apparent from an examination of the realities of international legal relations.
Adoption of the inductive approach as a proper method of operation of arbitration tribunals and international courts is an important component in the legal security of states. It prevents recognizing incidental or even single actions of states as law. At the same time, this approach does not require the practice which is supposed to be the basis of customary law to be both widespread and very intense. It is enough for it to be "sufficiently extensive and convincing". This applies particularly to areas which are "new and still unconsolidated", as in the case of certain zones separated relatively recently from the open sea. The inductive approach is particularly important in the field of delimitation of boundaries of maritime zones between adjacent and opposing countries, where one-sided delimitation is impossible.
Evidencing customary law
In order to determine the existence, validity and content of a customary rule, both of its elements have to be evidenced. By 1950, the International Law Commission accepted that proving may take place in particular with the help of such aids as collections of treaties, international case-law collections, collections of national legislation and case-law, diplomatic correspondence, expertise of national legal advisors, and collections of practice of international organisations 24 Formally, because of the principles of sovereignty and equality of states, the practice of all countries in the world has the same value. However, we know that for various reasons, ascertaining the practice of some developing countries can be difficult. In the Navigational and Related Rights case (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) of 13.07.2009, the ICJ also noted that situations in which "the practice, by its very nature, especially given the remoteness of the area and the small, thinly spread population, is not likely to be documented in any formal way in any official record" may occur 26 .
b) Practice as an element of customary law Whose should be the practice? Practice is considered a necessary part of the formation of a customary rule, its factual basis. Legally relevant facts are also applicable here. However, the question arises of whose practice it should be, what said practice should rely on, and what properties it should have to become the basis of a customary rule. The general approach is that it should be primarily the practice of states as primary subjects of international law and members of the international community 27 . In contemporary international law, on the grounds of sovereign equality (or, in fact, equal sovereignty), as a rule, states are formally equal. Accordingly, the practice of each of them has formally the same meaning and should essentially be treated the same. However, the rank of practice of great powers remains a concern. Formally, their practice does not enjoy a stronger position 28 . In practice, however, great powers in general are active in numerous areas of international life, and quite intensely at that, which makes their practice emerge in numerous scopes of regulation of international customary law. It is also hard to imagine that any international body would ignore the practice of a great power which can be relevant in the case at hand, even when it would merely create a broader normative context 29 . Similarly to general international law, in the international law of the sea the practice of all countries has formally the same rank. However, in practice, that of coastal states, which naturally and to the fullest extent are involved in maritime traffic, or in a given case, that of particularly interested countries or countries whose interests are specially affected, e.g. by the delimitation of the continental shelf (as in the North Sea Continental Shelf case [Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands] of 25 K Wolfke stresses that the conference itself, statements made during it, and documents resulting from or prepared at the conference, as in the case of the third conference on the law of the sea, are neither an expression of practice nor opinio juris. It is the behaviour of states and reaction of others to those very behaviours that are important. K Wolfke (n 2) 12-13. 26 Navigational and Related Rights case (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) Genève (2004) 87, who opposes conferring distinct importance to the practice of great powers (s'il y a un domaine dans lequel la seule puissance ne peut pas tout faire, c'est celui du droit). At the same time, the author points out that the powers have capacité de nuisance. They can thus hinder or even prevent the formation of a customary rule, especially in the region where they are located or on a wider scale (88). 29 See also K Wolfke (n 10) 78-79. 30 , or the exercise of fishing rights in economic zones, is particularly important. In certain regulatory areas, the practice of geographically disadvantaged states or archipelagic states may be of particular significance. The concept of interested countries, or those countries whose interests are specially affected, has to be assessed under the specific circumstances of a particular situation or case 31 . Despite the formal equality of states, taking the practice of some of them into account may be controversial, e.g. those with an aggressive policy and, in particular, those with totalitarian regimes. However, excluding practices of such countries should be done with great caution, based on serious and clearly demonstrated reasons. But in the case of the law of the sea, it is not so much the political acceptability of a state's practice, but chiefly the access to practice and its usefulness in the field of reconstruction of specific legal rules that is important. Due to the law of the sea being rooted in geography and the fact that customary law may also be both common, as well as particular in its character, then the situation of countries whose practice is to be the basis of the customary rules may be of particular significance (geographical proximity or similarity of the geographical situation). Sometimes, doubts whether a distributed or rare practice of countries in a similar geographical situation (e.g. coastal states) but located in different parts of the world may give rise to a common customary rule.
When we talk about the practice of states, we actually have in mind the practice of state bodies, especially those competent to act in the area of foreign policy, but also legislative, administrative and judicial bodies 32 . In the international law of the sea, in addition to the practice of authorities traditionally involved in international trade (head of state, head of government and government, foreign minister, diplomatic and consular service), it will be the practice of ministers specialized in maritime matters, maritime administration, customs, immigration, and border services operating in the maritime zones, and the navy that will be of particular importance.
In the era of institutionalization of international relations, the practice of international organisations, especially those which are active in the marine field (UN, IMO, marine protection organisations, fishing organisations) has gained some importance 33 . The practice in question will mainly be that concerning resolutions, which may contribute to shaping practice. It is, however, unable to replace the practice of states. The practice of regional integration organisations will be of greater and more intrinsic importance, provided that these organisations are equipped from their member states with competences regarding maritime matters (they can adopt legally binding resolutions in matters covered by law of the sea), especially when operating 30 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark) , [1969] ICJ Rep 3(43), para 74. 31 H Thirlway (n 14) 65, draws attention to the vagueness of the term "states 'whose interests are specially affected'. The author notes: "The precise significance of the qualification as to States whose interests are specially affected is unclear. The Court was dealing with a rule of delimitation of maritime areas; the question again has to be asked: did that category of States therefore include only neighbouring coastal States, or all States possessing a coastline, and consequently with claims to such areas? Since, however, only these States could participate in a practice of delimitation, this would amount to saying that, in this particular domain, the practice had to be universal". 32 in external maritime relations instead of or together with these states, concluding contracts in maritime matters or participating in international maritime organisations, including fishing or marine protection organisations (e.g. the European Union) 34 . In the era of globalization, significant mobilisation of non-state entitiesmultinational corporations, NGOs, and individuals -is often noted 35 . The impact of these entities on primary actors in international relations (states, and even great powers) on the processes of creating, applying and monitoring compliance with international law, including customary law, is recognised 36 . The question is, how important is their practice for emergence of customary rules of the law of the sea? If we accept such a definition of the international law of the sea as the one described in section 1 of this paper, the role of non-state actors in this regard is significantly reduced 37 . However, in some areas of this field (e.g. for the determination of the content of customary rules on sea zones, e.g. the principles of using an economic zone or marine protection), the marine practice of non-state entities (e.g. fishing, commercial, non-governmental organisation practice) can have a stimulating influence on the maritime activity of states.
What does practice consist of?
Practice as the foundation of a customary rule is naturally associated with action. It concerns issuing legal acts, concluding international agreements, diplomatic practice, adopting law enforcement acts, and, finally, actual behaviour 38 . The behaviour of states participating in customary practice should be characterized by a certain degree of repetition, substantive sameness of the case, and internal consistency. If the practice is legislative in character, acts should be consistent with their application. The same applies to the convergence between treaties and their application.
Acting in the field of law of the sea may consist of e.g. concluding sea treaties, issuing laws on sea zones, maritime administration, maritime affairs, issuing administrative decisions or judgments in maritime matters, taking actual action regarding sea ports, shipping lanes, delimitation of sea zones, exercise of territorial sea or island claims, building offshore installations, use of sea water and so on.
However, the question arises of whether failure to act (inaction, silence, negative practice) can also be the basis of customary law. The PCIJ, in the judgment in the SS "Lotus" case of 07.09.1927 (France v. Turkey) from action cannot be the basis of a custom. It is necessary that it be the result of an obligation of inaction 39 . Nowadays, a position generally approving practice involving failure to act was accepted by the International Law Commission in its works on the identification of customary international law. In the 2016 Draft Conclusions on CIL, the Commission concluded that "Practice may take a wide range of forms. It includes both physical and verbal acts. It may, under certain circumstances, include inaction" (draft conclusion 6 [7] , point 1). The Commission also emphasized that "There is no predetermined hierarchy among the various forms of practice" (point 3).
Special Rapporteur M. Wood pointed out in the third report 40 that a state's failure to act may be considered practice if three conditions are fulfilled: 1) if the conduct of the other state calls for a response (Pedra Branca Case, Malaysia/Singapore), which in his opinion "implies that the relevant practice ought to be one that affects the interests or rights of the State failing or refusing to act"; 2) "a State whose inaction is sought to be relied upon in identifying whether a rule of customary international law has emerged must have had actual knowledge of the practice in question or the circumstances must have been such that the State concerned is deemed to have had such knowledge" (Fisheries Case); 3) the inaction should be maintained "over a sufficient period of time". Therefore, acquiescence understood as qualified silence is relevant.
The approval of failure to act as a form of practice that can lead to a customary rule becomes much more problematic when tolerance is the only response to the actions of a single country or a small group of such countries. It is also debatable whether practice can solely rely on failure to act. In fact, a custom would then be reduced to one element: opinio juris.
What features should practice have?
For a practice to become the basis of customary law, it has to meet certain standards. They concern the quality and scope of practice. In the case of qualitative assessment of practice, it is indicated that it should be consistent, common, long-term, continuous and uninterrupted, efficient, and consistent with international law. The basis of a customary rule can only be such a practice which is carried out by states in a consistent and common manner. Heterogeneous, internally contradictory practice cannot be the basis of customary law. In principle, it is rather self-evident; the problem arises, however, when it comes to determining the required level of uniformity of practice. The doctrine indicates that at least two approaches are in competition with each other. According to one of them, the similarity of cases should be analysed in order to finally make a generalisation regarding what is valid. According to the second approach, only that which is common is left in the field of analysis, rejecting cases 39 The Court concluded that "Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstance alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty which are even only partially divergent. The result is a minimum common denominator which serves as the basis of a customary rule 41 . The problem may also occur at the level of determining what can and should be compared. Moreover, it may also be difficult to identify the minimum determinants which would be commonly applied in every field of international law. As part of international dispute settlement, establishing comparable elements of practice and a minimum level of practice will depend on the findings of the parties resolving the dispute.
Traditionally, it is pointed out that a practice which is to be the basis of customary law has to be age-old (lat. vetustas usus), and long-term (lat. diuturnus usus). Sometimes it is even indicated how many years must pass for a practice to become the basis of a customary rule. In the course of practice, acts questioning its current course should not occur (no acts questioning it; no lat. acta contraria). The requirement of a long-term, uninterrupted and unchallenged practice is not entirely alien to the contemporary international case-law. The judgment of the ICJ in the Navigational and Related Rights Case (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) of 13.07.2009 is a good example 42 . Assessing the rights of Nicaragua, the Court held that it is particularly significant that Nicaragua did not contest a "practice which had continued undisturbed and unquestioned over a very long period". At the same time, the Court refused to acknowledge that "the customary right extends to fishing from vessels on the river." It stated that "There is only limited and recent evidence of such a practice. Moreover that evidence is principally of the rejection of such fishing by the Nicaraguan authorities".
Today, both in the case-law and doctrine of international law, there is a tendency to reduce the importance of the temporal requirement of practice. Sometimes, a requirement of significant practice is introduced in its place 43 . Therefore, a practice should last a certain significant (minimum necessary) period of time, and should also be uninterrupted, constant or continuous 44 . Sometimes the criticism of the temporal requirement goes so far that the validity of rules is recognised even if such practice is only incidental. This was expressed in B. Cheng's instant custom concept 45 . More recently, though with certain modifications, it was expressed in M. P. Scharf's concept 46 , according to which a new customary rule can arise where a "fundamental technological or social change and recognition that the rule acquired customary law status despite a dearth and short period of state practice" takes place. This situation is referred to as a Grotian Moment. According to the author, in the case of law of the sea, it is expressed by the Truman Proclamation of 28.09.1945 on governance over the continental shelf. M.P. Scharf points out that "with respect to the Truman Proclamation, we have seen that developments in offshore drilling, paired 41 with the great need for oil, gas, and other resources following World War II, set the stage for radical change in the customary law of the sea". The Proclamation began the intensive practice of extending the exercise of territorial claims over the continental shelf by various countries, which, in a very short period of time, resulted in the formation of customary rules, despite the fact that the very definition of 'shelf' was subject to further changes 47 . Reduction of the significance of temporal criterion may also contribute to deriving a customary rule directly from Treaty provisions. However, it appears that although special cases do sometimes exist (especially those of rare, and even ambiguous practice), it is the very essence of practice that it should last for some time. It can be assumed that the duration required is inversely proportional to the intensity and representativeness of, at least internally non-contradictory, unquestioned practice.
Generally, it is expected of practice to be effective (actual practice), and not merely declaratory or verbal 48 . Such a position was taken by the ICJ in the Continental Shelf case in the dispute between Libya and Malta in its judgment of 03.06.1985 49 . But how can one reconcile the inadmissibility of verbal practice with the acceptance of practice involving failure to act? What kind of practice (effective or declaratory) should one consider behaviour consisting exclusively in the ratification of various international treaties?
Practice should also be consistent with applicable international law, especially with mandatory rules. It is, however, debatable, whether a customary law contrary to treaties binding the states parties concerned could be formed. Theoretically speaking, such a possibility should not be inadmissible. Customary rule may in fact derogate a treaty rule. In principle, there is no hierarchical relation between them; however, there may be treaties to which the parties have attributed special importance in their relations, such as the statutes of international organizations, including the UN Charter and the statutes of regional integration organizations, human rights protection and humanitarian law treaties, or treaties in the field of environmental protection whose being undermined by customary law seems very difficult, although cannot be entirely excluded. It would, however, be expected that all states parties will accept the change resulting from practice contrary to treaties, and treaty provisions contrary to the usual practice shall not be invoked (see also point 5 in part II).
Geographical coverage of practice may vary. Therefore, the question arises whether any practice, regardless of its geographic coverage, may be the basis of a customary rule. The prevailing view in the doctrine of international law is that customary law is universal, and its being effective in a narrower circle of countries is an exception. Prima facie this position corresponds with international case-law, and ICJ jurisprudence in particular, the latter of which does not preclude the existence of particular customary rules in only a few of its decisions 50 custom is based on the two-element concept, and therefore the presence of both the practice of specific countries as well their consent is necessary, then logically it is difficult to accept that a custom will be common (universal) even in the majority of cases. Meanwhile, it is quite commonly believed in the doctrine that "if a practice has achieved a sufficient level of generality, it is binding on all States", with the exception of persistent objectors 51 . In 2016, the International Law Commission in Draft ILC Conclusions on CIL clarified the concept of "general practice" not in the sense of the universality of the practice, but its prevalence, representativeness and cohesion: "The relevant practice must be general, meaning that it must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent" (draft conclusion 8 [9], point 1). It did not identify the personal scope of being bound by a custom based on the general custom. It added, however, that if practice is general, then "no particular duration is required" (draft conclusion 8 [9], point 2), which is misleading, as in reality practice is not created in an instant, but is usually the result of a burgeoning process. Elsewhere, the Commission expressly admitted the existence of particular custom ("regional, local or other"; draft conclusion 16 [15] ).
It is obvious that practice as a basis of a universally binding customary rule need not be universal. However, if one takes the view that it has to reach a sufficient level of generality, then under conditions of not always very intense (evaluation of the extensiveness of practice could also be relative) and sometimes diffuse practice, serious doubts as to when the threshold is exceeded may arise. One can also wonder whether such practice is still the basis of a particular custom or whether it is already the basis of a universal custom.
In the case of the law of the sea, the doctrine notes that customary law of the sea has a general, and even global range. It is always referred to as general international law 52 . Indeed, the global nature of oceans and seas related to them promotes perceiving customary law of the sea as a universal law. One cannot, however, rule out particular customs, especially when there are new or specific regulatory problems.
c) Opinio juris as an element of customary law
In addition to practice, opinio juris is also of major importance for proving the existence of a customary rule. There is no doubt that it is a necessary, but in itself not sufficient, component of customary law. However, the understanding of this structural element of customary law is also controversial. In simple terms, it can be assumed that there are two competing approaches in this matter: subjective and objective. According to the first of them, opinio juris means legal awareness of legal entities engaged in the customary practice, faith or belief of states that, in behaving the way they behave, they are acting in accordance with an actual rule of law, not custom 53 . According to the second approach, it is the will of states expressed in an objective manner, i.e. as a clear, or more often implicit acceptance of a rule emerging from practice that is at stake 54 . In draft conclusion 9 [10] in the 2016 Draft Conclusions on CIL, the International Law Commission defined opinio juris as acceptance of law, which means that "the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation". The Commission understands that it allows to distinguish customary law from "mere usage or habit." But, as explained by M. Wood in the second report on the works of the Commission, acceptance of law does not stand in opposition to psychological terms (a belief/feeling that the practice is obligatory) 55 . The prima facie requirement of opinio juris confirms a proactive concept of customary law in the sense that it will be effective if countries participating in a practice agree that it expresses an existing rule whose contents are consistently accepted. This consistent stance should accompany the whole period of formation of a customary rule. When a state involved in a practice presents a position that a given practice cannot be considered as a basis for customary rule or that it is opposed to declaring it binding, then such a state will not be linked to a possible customary rule. Such objection must be a persistent objection 56 . The ILC provides for admissibility of persistent objection in draft conclusion 15 [16] from 2016 Draft Conclusions on CIL. According to the Commission, "The objection must be clearly expressed, made known to other States, and maintained persistently". Persistent objection cannot challenge only those customary rules which protect the fundamental values of the international community.
Still, this clear picture of things is distorted. First, one has to realize that determination of customary rules usually happens a posteriori. In other words, the existence of this rule is mostly declared in the context of dispute settlements after a practice, which should be accompanied by the conviction that it expressed a legally binding rule, has taken place. In those circumstances, how can one know when to object and to what practice? In addition, opinio juris will be difficult to determine, especially if a practice is relatively rare and distant. The state may not realize that such practice will serve as a basis for custom and may choose not to raise an objection. Persistent objection would also be difficult to raise if the argument that the duration of practice should be significantly reduced, or if a customary rule were to be derived from legislative treaty provisions. Finally, the doctrine argues that external pressure may contribute to limiting persistent objection or its scope 57 . In the case of opinio juris, the important question is also whether it should rely on active, clear articulation of the position of the state (by its respective competent organs), or does tacit acceptance of the practice by all or at least some of the countries taking part in it, namely acquiescence, suffice. Some international dispute settlement bodies allow this. The PCIJ in the case of S.S. "Lotus" (France v. [T]he Court feels called upon to lay stress upon the fact that it does not appear that the States concerned have objected to criminal proceedings in respect of collision cases before the courts of a country other than that the flag of which was flown, or that they have made protests: their conduct does not appear to have differed appreciably from that observed by them in all case; of concurrent jurisdiction. This fact is directly opposed to the existence of a tacit consent on the part of States to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag is flown, such as the Agent for the French Government has thought it possible to deduce from the infrequency of questions of jurisdiction before criminal courts. It seems hardly probable, and it would not be in accordance with international practice, that the French Government in the OrtigiaOncle-Joseph case and the German Government in the Ekbatana-West-Hinder case would have omitted to protest against the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Italian and Belgian Courts, if they had really thought that this was a violation of international law.
The ILC does not exclude this possibility, although in contrast with practice, the Commission does not explicitly mention silent opinio juris as one of its possible forms (draft Conclusion 10 [11], point 1: "Evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) may take a wide range of forms"). However, in the third progress report on the works regarding identification of customary international law, M. Wood noted that "Inaction may also serve as evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) when it represents concurrence in a certain practice. […] in essence, we are here concerned with the toleration by a State of a practice of another or other States, in circumstances that attest to the fact that the State choosing not to act considers such practice to be consistent with international law". Such acquiescence, in the words of the Chamber of the International Court of Justice in Gulf of Maine, "is equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent" 59 . Also, certain representatives of the doctrine of international law accept this eventuality 60 . What is more, sometimes it has been indicated that it may be presumed that consent is unanimous if such consent is expressed by the majority of states 61 . This means the admissibility of omitting active consent of some countries.
However, it seems that simple and unconditional acceptance of such an approach could, under certain circumstances, be very questionable and controversial. It could lead to arbitrary recognition of rules which are in fact not accepted by states (which is not unrealistic in a situation where a customary rule is reconstructed a posteriori). Firstly, it is difficult to approve tacit consent to customary rules in situations where it were to accompany practice involving failure to act or rare practice in this manner. Secondly, tacit consent should not include all states which participated in the practice. At least some of the states need to articulate such consent clearly. Thirdly, the approval of presumption of unanimous consent if the majority of countries expresses said consent also carries the risk of imposing a customary rule on states which have not accepted it although they did not articulate this view, e.g. thinking that a particular practice does not concern them. The risk of imposing would be lesser if great powers were concerned, but it is quite conceivable in the case of medium and small states. 
d) The interplay between usus and opinio juris
From the point of view of reconstruction of customary rules, it is essential to determine the temporal relationship and the value between the two constitutive elements. In the first case, the question is whether usus and opinio juris must occur simultaneously or whether one of them can or should occur earlier. The doctrine sometimes suggests that in previous international law, it was believed that practice precedes opinio juris. More recently, the analysis begins with the verification of opinio juris 62 .
It should be noted that beginning the reconstruction of a customary rule with determining opinio juris, can, in fact, lead to fundamental changes in the assumptions of customary law. It causes the practice to be formed in a manner which aims to match a specific thesis (view). This is a very real prospect in various fields of international law, including law of the sea, when the practice is relatively rare, dispersed. However, it leads to arbitrariness.
Another issue is whether both these elements have the same value. It is indicated in the doctrine that nowadays practice is losing its evidential importance. As a result, there is doubt as to whether it is acceptable to reduce or waive the investigation of practice in cases where states clearly accept the existence of a customary rule 63 . International courts seem to accept such a solution, including in the field of the law of the sea. However, this can also mean limiting the custom to one element.
Critical approaches to customary international law and their impact on the customary international law of the sea a) One-element concepts of customary law
The traditional two-element concept of international customary law was and is subjected to criticism. Sometimes this criticism is only a reinterpretation of the classic understanding of the individual elements of custom 64 . In other situations, it leads to undermining the two-element concept and replacing it with more or less definite one-element concepts. The latter take two forms: 1) they aim to merge usus and opinio juris, effectively limiting custom to practice; 2) they limit custom to opinio juris.
The first of these approaches appears especially in the older doctrine of international law. Some of its representatives took the view that practice and opinio juris are an indissoluble whole: two aspects of the same phenomenon. As a result, there is no need for separate proof 65 . This approach, however, leads to depreciation of the importance of opinio juris. Currently, its expression is assigning merit to resolutions of organisations, which aims to correspond with opinio juris of countries participating in adopting them.
Today, it is more and more popular to reduce the importance of practice in favour of opinio juris. A mild form of this approach could be observed in relation to generating customary rules from treaty provisions. In particular, the ICJ in the 1986 Nicaraguan case admitted customary rules based on a "simplified" practice of states which were not parties to the treaty. 62 A more radical approach is sometimes adopted (it is not consistent) by international criminal courts 66 . It arises mainly when a court is faced with the problem of establishing the existence of customary rules according to the traditional approach. They are then willing to fundamentally reinterpret the significance of practice or even ignore it. Without delving more deeply into this field of international law, we shall limit ourselves to two examples. The statements of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are particularly noteworthy.
See also the Anto Furundzija case of 10.12.1998 67 : in justifying the transformation of the treaty provisions on the prohibition of torture in time of armed conflict to customary norms, the Court found that it is evidenced by the widespread acceptance of treaties prohibiting torture by states 68 , the practice of states consisting in abandoning actions contradicting treaties, and the recognition of the formation of customary law in a more general scope by the ICJ. The ICTY stated:
First, these treaties and in particular the Geneva Conventions have been ratified by practically all States of the world. Admittedly those treaty provisions remain as such and any contracting party is formally entitled to relieve itself of its obligations by denouncing the treaty (an occurrence that seems extremely unlikely in reality); nevertheless the practically universal participation in these treaties shows that all States accept among other things the prohibition of torture. In other words, this participation is highly indicative of the attitude of States to the prohibition of torture. Secondly, no State has ever claimed that it was authorised to practice torture in time of armed conflict, nor has any State shown or manifested opposition to the implementation of treaty provisions against torture. When a State has been taken to task because its officials allegedly resorted to torture, it has normally responded that the allegation was unfounded, thus expressly or implicitly upholding the prohibition of this odious practice. Thirdly, the International Court of Justice has authoritatively, albeit not with express reference to torture, confirmed this custom-creating process: in the Nicaragua case it held that common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which inter alia prohibits torture against persons taking no active part in hostilities, is now well-established as belonging to the corpus of customary international law and is applicable both to international and internal armed conflicts.
In Rwanda and Yugoslavia (2010) 175 et seq. As far as identification of customary rules by the ICTY is concerned, the author distinguishes the source-based approach, deductive/core-rights approach and mixed methodologies, and in the case of the ICTR, common sense approach and deductive approach. 67 IT-95-17/1-T, para 138. 68 Other international criminal courts attach importance to the attitude of countries towards international agreements. usus or diuturnitas has taken shape. This is however an area where opinio juris sive necessitates may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio necessitates, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law".
b) Criticism of the regulatory capacity of customary law
The criticism of traditional recognition of customary law also stems from the belief that custom, especially from the two-element point of view, when facing the dynamics of changes in international relations, in particular given the increasing problems of a global nature, has lost its regulatory ability, or in the very least that ability has been seriously undermined. In this situation, there are different approaches aimed at addressing this issue. D. P. Fidler lists three proposals for amendments 70 . The first is the dinosaur concept, which is associated with resigning from custom or treating it as a primary source of international law, and replacing it with treaties and law-making activities of international institutions.
The second of them is connected with granting customary law a certain impetus by increasing the role of UN General Assembly resolutions. In this perspective, customary law becomes the main force of regulatory progress and innovation. Finally, the third proposal was described as a dangerous prospect. The author associates it with criticism of the two-element concept, particularly from a human rights perspective, warning against possible misuse. In particular, he indicates that a custom is based on moral imperatives rather than an analysis of necessary elements (e.g. prohibition of torture or use of force are considered customary norms, despite the practice looking rather different). The author also warns against reducing practice (opinio juris) to the attitude of parties towards treaties, in particular to whether they have been incorporated into national law. This would mean making customary law subject to national law.
Against this background, the author presents a liberal concept of customary law according to which the emphasis should be put on whose practice and opinio juris should be taken into account when reconstructing customary rules. To this end, liberal and illiberal countries have to be distinguished. As a result, the practice and opinio juris of all countries cannot be treated on a par. Only that which comes from liberal states should be taken into account. In turn, constant opposition should only apply in relations of liberal countries with illiberal ones. 
Codification and progressive development of the international law of the sea
For centuries, states have been concluding treaties whose subject matter involved various issues concerning governance and use of the sea. However, until very recent times, the basic rules of the law of the sea were designated by customary law. Multilateral treaties concerning the law of the sea appeared only in the twentieth century. 71 They have become an instrument of codification and progressive development of the law of the sea. In the interwar period, the issue of sea ports was first addressed. On 09.12.1923, the Barcelona Convention and Statute on the International Régime of Maritime Ports 72 was signed, although it gained very limited acceptance. It was an element of progressive development of the law of the sea rather than its codification. On 13.03. -12.04.1930 , under the auspices of the League of Nations, a conference deliberated on, among others, the codification of rules governing the status of territorial waters, and, within this framework, sea straits within their borders and the territorial sea, which, however, did not produce any results 73 . In this case, it is also difficult to claim that these discussed and disputed matters could be seen as customary law at the time.
Proper codification took place after Second World War II. It was done as part of the Law of the Sea Conference, with only the first conference, held on 24.02.-27.04.1958, and the third conference which lasted from 03.12.1973 to 10.12.1982 being fruitful. The second Law of the Sea Conference of 1960 yielded no results. As a result of the 1958 conference, four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea of 29.04.1958 were signed; the subjects of those conventions were territorial sea and contiguous zone 74 , high seas 75 , fishing and conservation of the living resources 76 and the continental shelf 77 , respectively. The result of the third conference of the law of the sea was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10.12.1982 78 . The Convention regulates the legal status of sea zones, and also the status of straits and sea channels, archipelagic states, islands, enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, the legal situation of landlocked countries, seabed beyond the jurisdiction of states (the so-called Area), issues related to marine environment protection and marine research, and the basic ways of resolving maritime disputes. In the exercise of UNCLOS, the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS (28.07.1994) 79 , as well as 80 . Accepting a convention on the law of the sea, especially one as extensive as UNCLOS, was not an obvious step. It was pointed out that it will bind only those countries which will bind themselves to it. In contradiction to this line of argument, it was brought up that the Convention of 1982 "was, at least in its fundamental concepts, an accurate picture of the existing or evolving customary law of the sea" 81 . As far as law of the sea is concerned, there is no complete agreement as to the scope of the codification of customary rules in conventions developed within the Law of the Sea Conference. Nevertheless, the doctrine indicates directionally that at the time of their conclusion they codified the customary law of the sea (existing at the time of signing) in relation to internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone and the open sea. However, gradual development occurred in respect of archipelagic waters, the Area, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Regulation related to internal sea waters and historic bays was deemed fragmentary and not satisfying customary rules 82 . In addition, it can be assumed that a gradual development of the law of the sea in the area of marine environment protection and marine research occurred particularly through UNCLOS 83 .
The 1958 Conventions, UNCLOS and customary law
The relations between the major conventions of the law of the sea (the Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS) and customary law were not clearly defined in those documents. This can be evaluated in at least three aspects: substantive, formal and conflict. Let us review each of them.
a) Substantive aspects of relations between the law of the sea conventions and customary law
General remarks Substantive aspects of relations between the law of the sea conventions and customary law are a complex issue. With the aim of simplification and order, certain roles that substantive provisions of these conventions can play in relation to customary law can be spoken of. In this respect it is worth noting the statement of the ICJ contained in the judgment in the Continental Shelf case (Libya v. Malta) of 03.06.1985 84 . The Court held here that "multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them". In this way, the Court has defined three roles which multilateral treaties can assume in relation to custom: 1) a recording function; 2) a defining The latter can indeed be understood both as generating customary norms, as well as contributing to the development of existing customary rules.
In turn, G. M. Danilenko pointed out that the temporal relations between customary law and treaties may be of prior, simultaneous or sequential nature 86 . In the first case the treaty codifies customary law, usually contributing to its crystallization. The author pointed out that a customary rule does not disappear even after the codification, even in the relations between states parties 87 . Treaties do not necessarily codify the customary law in full; sometimes, reservations regarding them can be expressed, thus modifying the parties' position on customary rules. Danilenko also pointed out, and rightly so, that customary law retains significance in relations between states parties: 1) in matters not covered by the treaties; 2) when the treaties refer to customary law; 3) if the treaty does not apply to some of the issues it generally regulates; 4) in cases governed by the treaty, but excluded as a result of objections to reservations. Codified customary rules will also continue to be in force between states parties and third countries, especially if not all the countries bound by customary law are parties to the codifying treaty 88 . The relationship of simultaneity occurs when a treaty in relation to particular field is concluded, and at the same time, customary law is being formed. In particular, this applies to situations which are not covered by the treaty, the relations between the parties to the treaty and third countries and between the third countries themselves. Finally, sequential relation takes place when a treaty generates customary norms. This issue has taken an interesting turn in the case-law of the ICJ, as discussed below.
The International Law Commission, somewhat summarizing the case-law and doctrinal analysis on the relationship between treaties and customary law, accepted in its 2016 Draft Conclusions on CIL (draft Conclusion 11 [12] ) that:
"[A] treaty may reflect a rule of customary international law if it is established that the treaty rule:
(a) codified a rule of customary international law existing at the time when the treaty was concluded; 85 See MH Mendelson (n 27) 294 et seq. 86 See GM Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (1993) (95), para. 178. The Court also pointed out the consequences of separate legal existence of prima facie identical standards: "There are a number of reasons for considering that, even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence. This is so from the standpoint of their applicability.
[…] Rules which are identical in treaty law and in customary international law are also distinguishable by reference to the methods of interpretation and application. A State may accept a rule contained in a treaty not simply because it favours the application of the rule itself, but also because the treaty establishes what that State regards as desirable institutions or mechanisms to ensure implementation of the rule. Thus, if that rule parallels a rule of customary international law, two rules of the same content are subject to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify their implementation, depending on whether they are customary rules or treaty rules". 88 GM Danilenko (n 86) 154, stresses that codification conventions cannot be considered "conclusive evidence of customary law", as they merely reflect the positions of parties. As a result, the attitude towards customary law should be balanced by evidence of the existence of a custom in non-treaty conditions.
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(b) has led to the crystallization of a rule of customary international law that had started to emerge prior to the conclusion of the treaty; or (c) has given rise to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris), thus generating a new rule of customary international law".
The Commission also noted that a rule being repeated in various treaties is not necessarily the proof of existence of a customary rule.
The Commission's reasoning is not entirely accurate, because if a provision actually reflects a customary rule, then it cannot generate it at the same time. Similarly, although to a lesser extent, if a provision crystallises a rule which "had started to emerge prior to the Conclusion of the treaty", then at least at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, said customary rule is not yet formed. It was the treaty that lead to specifying the content of a customary rule by clarifying it. Therefore, it can only reflect it as far as certain elements are concerned.
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that a clear demarcation of the three roles multilateral treaties may have in relation to customary law can sometimes be difficult. It is also contractual in nature to some extent. It may indeed prove that a particular provision of the convention contains elements which are codifying, crystallizing and generating or developing customary rules at the same time. In particular, a clear distinction between the case of codification and crystallization can be difficult, because codification always involves specifying and crystallizing customary rules. Therefore, in this study, these two roles of the treaty will be linked to each other.
Conventions on the law of the sea as codification and crystallization of customary law
Customary rules which are codified in treaties obtain the necessary level of precision. However, one has to remember that the basis of validity is parallel to and independent of treaties 89 . A codifying treaty rule and a customary rule with identical content will apply alongside each other. Parties to the treaty will therefore be bound in parallel by a treaty rule and a corresponding customary rule. A potential loss of the binding force of a treaty will not necessarily mean the loss of binding force of a customary rule. Interesting functional dependencies may arise between a parallel treaty rule and a customary rule in force. In particular, the interpretation of a treaty rule may contribute to the development of content (clarification, supplementation, development, and even adjustment) of a parallel customary rule.
In a number of cases, international courts have recognised the applicability of customary rules corresponding to the provisions of the Convention, thus reaffirming their codifying nature 90 over the air space above its territory. That convention, in conjunction with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the territorial sea and to the air space above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court has no doubt that these prescriptions of treaty-law merely respond to firmly established and longstanding tenets of customary international law".
More specifically, the Court recognized the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea as a customary rule. It stated 93 : " [I] t is true that in order to enjoy access to ports, foreign vessels possess a customary right of innocent passage in territorial waters for the purposes of entering or leaving internal waters; Article 18, paragraph I (b), of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, does no more than codify customary international law on this point."
The continental shelf is a relatively newly designated area in the law of the sea. However, its current understanding and the legal regime concerning it are considered matters of customary law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf case (Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands) of 20.02.1969 94 , the ICJ found that Articles 1-3 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf were then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the continental shelf, amongst them the question of the seaward extent of the shelf; the juridical character of the coastal State's entitlement; the nature of the rights exercisable; the kind of natural resources to which these relate; and the preservation intact of the legal status as high seas of the waters over the shelf, and the legal status of the superjacent airspace.
On the other hand, in the Judgement in the Territorial and maritime dispute case (Nicaragua v. Colombia) of 19.11.2012 95 it stated that "the definition of the continental shelf set out in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary law". A little further, following the approving parties to the dispute and its earlier case law, it stated that "the principles of maritime delimitation enshrined in Articles 74 and 83 [and so, concerning In it, the Court pointed out that the provisions of multilateral conventions (it considered here the equidistance principle of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf) may be considered customary norms, as long as they "at all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law". Moreover, the ICJ ruled that a treaty norm could become a customary norm "even without the passage of any considerable period of time" if we are dealing with "a very widespread and representative participation in the convention", "provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected". At the same time, the Court noted that:
"[A]lthough the passage of only short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; -and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved".
The Court thus formulated the three conditions that must be met for a standard treaty to be able to generate a parallel and, as a rule, identical in content, customary rule. He included among them: 1) the treaty rule intended to be the model for customary rules should have a rule-setting potential, understood as the ability to be the basis of a general rule (it is interesting that the Court did not state directly that the rule should codify existing customary law); 2) the parties to the treaty containing legislative provisions are to be a widespread and representative group of states, including specially affected states; according to the ICJ, this criterion exempts from meeting the temporal requirement, even in the form of a considerable period of time; 3) the elements of a customary rule should comply with additional requirements: a) the practice should be both extensive and potentially homogeneous (uniform) with the instituted provision; b) such a practice should be accompanied by a general (common) recognition that a legal rule or obligation is coming into being.
In its judgment in the Military and paramilitary activities of the United States in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) case of 27.06.1986 103 , the ICJ went a step further. It pointed out that customary practice generated under the influence of a multilateral treaty does not necessarily reflect the content of a treaty rule. Its general compliance with the treaty provisions and a belief that cases of conduct not compliant with a rule constitute an infringement, rather than a recognition of a new rule, should suffice. It held:
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other's interna1 affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
In the context of generating customary rules from multilateral treaty provisions, it is worth considering the impact of making reservations, and, to a lesser extent, interpretative declarations to provisions, which would form the basis of a given rule on the formation of customary rules. The issues of reservations and interpretative declarations were dealt with by the UN International Law Commission. In its Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties of the International Law Commission of 2011 104 , it stated first that "The fact that a treaty provision reflects a rule of customary international law does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the formulation of a reservation to that provision" (rule 3.1.5.3.). It added that "A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a rule of customary international law does not of itself affect the rights and obligations under that rule, which shall continue to apply as such between the reserving State or organization and other States or international organizations which are bound by that rule" (rule 4.4.2.). Therefore, according to the ILC, a reservation does not diminish the existence of a customary rule between the parties to a treaty and third parties. However, one may wonder whether such reservations should not be treated as a kind of persistent objection. Although the bases of treaty provisions and customary rules are different, a reservation refers to the content of a provision which codifies a customary rule. One can also have serious doubts as to whether a treaty provision to which a reservation has been entered (especially more than one) can be the basis of new customary rules between parties entering such reservations and third countries.
b) Formal relations between conventions on the law of the sea and customary law
Convention referrals to customary rules: general remarks The customary law can play a certain regulatory role in a particular field of international law as a set of rules which refer to the provisions of treaties regulating this field. Reference can rely on resigning from direct regulation and formally granting customary law a role which is complementary to the convention system. Then the convention provisions and customary rules will co-regulate, each in its own scope, a particular matter. Reference may, however, also rely on the fact that the convention provisions will be used in accordance with or under the conditions established on the basis of customary rules. Finally, we have to deal with exclusionary reference, i.e. a situation when we will use the convention provisions, unless customary rules state otherwise. The reference in question goes beyond a systemic interpretation of Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which, when interpreting a treaty, one should consult "any relevant rules of international law Economics [Vol 8:2 Special Issue applicable in the relations between the parties". When it comes to references, it is a matter of direct application of customary rules in addition to or instead of treaty provisions or as sources of criteria or conditions for applying treaty rules.
From a formal point of view, references may take various forms. These references can be either direct or indirect. Direct references may be explicit or hidden. Direct references guide those applying the law directly to customary rules. They can, however, do this explicitly or through wider formulas in which applicable customary rules could be discovered. For example, other rules of international law can be such a formula. In turn, indirect reference is when a treaty provision refers to different treaty provisions from which the obligation to apply customary rules results, provided they are applicable in a given case.
In respect of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 1958, only in two of them (in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the High Seas) are there general references (hidden references) to "other rules of international law". In the Convention on the Territorial Sea they are found in the context of the exercise of sovereignty over the territorial sea of Article 1(2), innocent passage through this sea -Article 14(4), Article 17, Article 22(2), and also in the Convention on the High Seas in the context of the exercise of freedom of the seas -Article 2. Direct references to customary rules are nowhere to be found.
The situation with UNCLOS and related agreements is not much better. The only clear link with customary law is in Article 221(1) of UNCLOS, concerning measures to avoid pollution arising from maritime causalities. It provides that:
Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.
The customary law appears unambiguously in the interpretative declarations submitted by the States Parties to UNCLOS, especially in the context of the right of innocent passage (Belgium, Ecuador, Iran, Serbia, Italy), the contiguous zone (Serbia), the exclusive economic zone, including the rights of geographically disadvantaged countries (Slovenia) 105 . In the UNCLOS, indirect reference can also be incidentally found. It appears in the context of determining convention rules for the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. According to these articles (Article 74(1) and Article 83(1)), delimitation is to be effected "between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution".
Therefore 126 , there was an attempt to apply the customary principles on the continental shelf to historic waters, the ICJ stated that the concept of historic waters/historic bays is governed by customary law, different from the customary law regulating the continental shelf (and codified in 1958, or at the very least in 1982). The regime concerning historic waters is based on "acquisition and occupation", while the other is based on "the existence of rights 'ipso facto and ab initio'" (shelf as a natural extension of the land territory of a country).
Another possibility is tacit admission of the formation and development of customary rules in areas in which, despite efforts, it was impossible to negotiate treaty solutions. We encounter this situation in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (FRG v. Iceland) judgement of 25.07.1974 127 , where the ICJ stated that since the Law of the Sea Conference of 1958 -and despite the failure of the Conference of 1960 -the two concepts of customary law regarding the width of the territorial sea and the scope of the fishing rights, which were not been settled by treaties, had crystallized. According to the Court:
44. The 1960 Conference failed by one vote to adopt a text governing the two questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and the extent of fishery rights. However, after that Conference the law evolved through the practice of States on the basis of the debates and near-agreements at the Conference. Two concepts have crystallized as customary law in recent years arising out of the general consensus revealed at that Conference. The first is the concept of the fishery zone, the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a 12-mile limit from the baselines appears now to be the US cannot be seen as akin to a persistent objector but rather as a supporter and accordingly should be given certain weight in any analysis of weather the Parts of the Convention have passed into customary international law. This is particularly case with respect to the navigational provisions of the LOS Convention which have been of great strategic importance to the US". See DR Rothwell, The Impact of State Practice on the Jurisdictional Framework Contained in the LOS Convention: A Commentary in AG Oude Elferink (ed) (n 81) 147. 126 [1982] ICJ Rep 74-75, para 100. 127 Fisheries Jurisdiction (FRG v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 175 (191-192, 195) .
At the same time, the Court held that certain rules can be regarded as customary in the case of any maritime delimitation between neighbouring countries. Among them were the following principles:
113. […] (1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that: 114. On the basis of the conclusions already reached, the Chamber has found that general customary international law is not the proper place in which to seek rules specifically prescribing the application of any particular equitable criteria, or the use of any particular practical methods, for a delimitation of the kind requested in the present case. As already noted, customary international law merely contains a general requirement of the application of equitable criteria and the utilization of practical methods capable of implementing them. It is therefore special international law that must be looked to, in order to ascertain whether that law, as at present in force between the Parties to this case, does or does not include some rule specifically requiring the Parties, and consequently the Chamber, to apply certain criteria or certain specific practical methods to the delimitation that is requested.
New maritime issues and the regulatory capacity of the customary international law of the sea In the field of interest of the law of the sea, new issues sometimes arise (e.g. new aspects of exploration and exploitation of the Area, development of artificial islands), and sometimes they emerge at the point of convergence of the law of the sea and other areas of international law, e.g. environmental law (among others, new forms of marine pollution, the impact of climate change on seas, protection of the genetic resources of the seas), or new forms of old phenomena or practices (e.g. overfishing, de facto piracy on territorial waters, de jure piracy and robbery). The question is whether, in relation to this matter, customary rules may still arise, and whether they would pass the test as an effective regulatory measure.
The answer to this question is not clear. Surely one cannot rule out the formation of states' practice associated with various new challenges and issues related to the sea, and, accordingly, acceptance of this practice as customary law. This may be especially true if we accept the formation of custom in an accelerated manner. However, certain reservations have to be made with regard to this issue. The first of these is associated with a natural tendency to seek normalisation, which could be applied to new issues, treaties and binding instruments of international organizations. So before these parties or international bodies examining the case at hand call upon the custom as a possible, but yet unproven reservoir of rules, they will attempt to use available methods of interpretation or certain provisions of written law. In this case, Another reservation is connected with the nature of customary rules. They probably will not arise in situations involving a detailed regulation of technical standards, which is important for certain aspects of exploration and exploitation of the Area and protecting the seas from pollution. The formation of custom in terms of management of fishing resources of the seas and their protection can also be difficult. In addition to general principles that could become customary law, there is a need for specific regulation of an administrative nature. They are provided by regional fishing organisations or marine protection organisations.
An obstacle in the formation of customary rules (and to some extent treaty rules as well) can be the rapid and variable dynamics of a particular field, as is the case with the impact of climate change on the seas. In this case, multilateral agreements or even resolutions of international organisations can be a better regulatory measure.
Political considerations can also act against the formation of new customary rules. It can be assumed that if a new issue involves aspects which are either military or related to state security (e.g. the question of naval warfare or armament), the acceptance of customary rules may be significantly hindered. It may also occur with certain problems if a new issue substantially violates the fundamental principles defining an international status quo, which is the case with the so-called Somali piracy 136 .
CONCLUSIONS
As a rule, customary law in the international law of the sea is based on the traditional two-element concept, although various contemporary challenges are contributing both to reinterpreting practice as well as to its acceptance as law. Reinterpretative aspirations should, however, have their limits and should not be associated with depreciation of the significance of any element of custom, which sometimes manifests itself in the international settlement of maritime disputes for fear of non liquet. One cannot forget that the ends cannot justify the means at all costs. Custom cannot be degenerated in a manner that leads to a complete paradigm shift, and consequently, even to denying the rule of law, which after all involves a certain predictability and legal certainty. Therefore, one should strive to establish clear exceptions to the two-element concept of custom and precise conditions for recourse to such exceptions. Perhaps expanding the catalogue of sources of international law to natural (moral) law rules, reflecting the core values of the international community and humanity, would be a better way than shattering the concept of custom.
In the field of the law of the sea, customary law in its basic body is closely related to maritime treaties, particularly the Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS. Although it has been codified and well-defined in these treaties to a significant extent, it has not disappeared. While it does not play a key regulatory role, it is not marginalized. To some extent, evolution has proceeded from customary law to treaty 136 law, and back again to customary law, which is generated by treaty rules; but on the other hand, it develops, complements and clarifies these rules. In addition, customary law is still in force between the parties to the sea conventions, between them and third countries, and between third countries themselves. In the case of new marine challenges, the importance of customary rules is limited, which largely stems from the inherent properties of customary rules.
